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ABSTRACT 
Regionalized base operating support management was implemented in the Navy 
Region Southwest on 1 October 1998, as part of a Navy-wide plan to reduce 
infrastructure costs and improve services. Due to the scope of this reorganization, the full 
effect of the change in terms of measurable cost-savings and improved customer service 
will not be realized for at least five years. However, interim effects may be analyzed. 
This study conducts a mid-transition review and analysis of the current outcomes 
in terms of cost savings and level of service in the Navy Region Southwest to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the regionalization process.   Specifically, the study examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of regionalization to determine if the goals set forth in the 
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Plan when restructuring began are being met: to 
apply state-of-the-market business practices and reduce infrastructure costs to improve 
efficiency and increase customer service quality.   Findings indicate that, although the 
Region faces budgetary challenges, the processes established through regionalization are 
reducing costs and improving the overall level of service for customers throughout the 
Region. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       PURPOSE 
This thesis will assess the outcomes of regionalization in the Navy Region 
Southwest (NRSW).    The goal is to determine if the implementation has met the 
objectives of regionalization set forth in the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Shore 
Infrastructure Strategic Plan: apply state-of-the-market business practices and reduce 
infrastructure costs to increase efficiency and improve customer service.    Research 
consisted of: (1) a review of defense business reform initiatives, (2) a review of 
regionalization history in the NRSW, (3) a review of the regionalization process in the 
NRSW, (4) a review of strategic analysis literature, and (5) synthesis of literature and 
application of theory to assess the outcomes of regionalization in the Navy Region 
Southwest. 
B.        BACKGROUND 
Regionalized base operating support management was implemented in the Navy 
Region Southwest on 1 October 1998, as part of a Navy-wide plan to reduce 
infrastructure costs and improve services. Due to the scope of this reorganization, the full 
effect of the change in terms of measurable cost-savings and improved customer service 
will not be realized for at least five years. Nevertheless, a mid-transition review and 
analysis of the current outcomes in terms of cost savings and level of service is important 
for evaluating the interim effectiveness of the regionalization process. 
The timing of the study also allows the researchers to interview regional staff 
members who still retain corporate knowledge of the legacy structure, were involved in 
the transition, and have now worked with the new structure for over eighteen months. 
Their insight and experience are vital for an effective qualitative analysis. 
A related issue is examination of the role of Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) in 
regionalization with respect to restructuring of the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 
Depot, North Island. Specifically, the research will examine the decisions that led to the 
transfer of resource management authority from CNAP to CNRSW, and the 
circumstances resulting in its transfer back to CNAP. 
C.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Has regionalization in the Navy Region Southwest achieved the goals set forth in 
the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Plan when restructuring began, namely apply 
state-of-the-market business practices and reduce infrastructure costs to improve 
efficiency and increase customer service? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• Have significant cost savings been achieved through regionalization? Are 
these cost savings measurable and have they been measured? 
• Have the level, quantity, and quality of service to regional commands 
improved as a result of regionalization? Are there measurable indicators 
for these variables? 
• Are there commonalities across programs in cost savings and/or quality of 
service? If so, what are the commonalities and have they been exploited 
for cost reduction and improved service provision? 
• What were the factors involved in the assignment and reassignment of 
AIMD resource management authority and responsibility in 
implementation of regionalization? 
D.       SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on the outcomes of regionalization in the Navy 
Region Southwest.   It will include (1) a quantitative analysis of the financial outcomes 
across the programs; (2) a qualitative analysis of the quality of service across the 
2 
programs, (3) an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses associated with the 
regionalization in meeting the objectives of the CNO, and, (4) an analysis of the impact 
of restructuring on AIMD resource management. This thesis will not provide a final 
assessment of regionalization in NRSW nor make recommendations based on findings, as 
the process is in a continual state of refinement and improvement. 
E.   METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this research is divided into six steps:   (1) review of 
pertinent literature, (2) collection of data, (3) interviews with regional and tenant staff 
members, (4) summarization of information, (5) data analysis to identify strengths and 
weaknesses, and (6) assessment of outcomes of regionalization. 
• Literature: A review of the literature was conducted on defense business 
reform initiatives, Navy regionalization, and strategic analysis methods. 
The literature was used to establish a foundational understanding of the 
process that lead to the decision to regionalize, to explain the 
regionalization process in NRSW, and to select the most appropriate 
method to assess the outcomes of regionalization in NRSW. 
• Data: Data were collected from NRSW, AIRPAC, and OPNAV N46. 
These data included organizational structures, standards of service, 
personnel and cost data, budget data, customer and employee survey 
results, and local lessons learned. 
• Interviews: CNRSW staff members, CNAP staff members, and tenant 
command staff members were interviewed. 
• Summarization of information: Information obtained in (2) and (3) above 
have been summarized for content and compiled into relevant data in 
preparation for analysis. 
• Data analysis: Data compiled in (4) above is analyzed to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the regionalization process. 
• Assessment of outcomes: Analysis conducted in (5) above is used to 
assess the outcomes of regionalization in the NRSW. 
F.        ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II explains the reasons behind the defense management reform process 
that began in the last decade in an attempt to curb infrastructure spending and reviews the 
major defense initiatives that laid the framework for infrastructure reform in the Navy. 
Chapter III describes the regionalization process in Navy Region Southwest, 
details the implementation process, and describes the change in leadership roles and 
responsibilities resulting from regionalization. 
Chapter IV presents an analysis of data collected through interviews and 
document review. The chapter explains the purpose of the analysis and the methodology, 
describes the interview and data collection process, and presents the data analysis, 
identifying strengths and weaknesses of the regionalization process in the NRSW. 
Chapter V provides conclusions, answers research questions, and identifies areas 
for further research. 
G.       BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Regionalization of infrastructure support services within a geographic region such 
as Navy Region Southwest has broad fiscal, readiness, and quality of life implications for 
the commands served by the Region. To date, no analysis has been conducted to 
determine the primary strengths and weaknesses of the process. By identifying and 
summarizing these strengths and weaknesses, this research may help refine the process in 
the Region. It will also highlight factors involved in AIMD resource management to 
enable improved financial management procedures. 
II.     DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REFORM INITIATIVES 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the reasons behind the defense management reform process 
that began in the last decade in an attempt to curb infrastructure spending. It then 
reviews the major defense initiatives that laid the framework for infrastructure reform in 
the Navy. Finally it describes actions taken by the Department of the Navy to implement 
regionalization as a means to reduce infrastructure costs. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES 
The 1990s marked a decade of severe budget reductions for the Department of 
Defense. The post-cold war era ushered in a policy of force drawdown and reduced 
defense spending. The Navy's budget, exclusive of the Marine Corps, was reduced 35 
percent over the course of the decade, from $105 billion in 1991, to $68.3 billion in 1999 
[Figure 2.1]. 
As the decade began, the new fiscal environment indicated that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) needed to reform its management policies. DoD examined successful 
private sector policies and looked to current academic publications of public management 
scholars such as Jones and Thompson for direction. Drawing from private sector 
economic strategies, Jones and Thompson recommended reinventing and reengineering 
as means to improve public management. Their concept of public sector management 
reform identified the goals of these processes as "increased customer satisfaction and 
improved service quality combined with greater efficiency" [Jones and Thompson 1999]. 












Avpragii Annyft! 11 3% Decline PY 91-9*: 
1 &¥<, Decline FY 35-39 
USMC P-oqran-s 
Average Annual 8.5% Dec? ne f-Y 91-9Ä. 
M% Incease Fy 95-99 
1S32 1&S3 199^1 f995 1996 
Fiscal Year 
1997 1393 1999 
|TY 1391 1SS2 1S33 lS*i 1995 1996 1997    1    199B    ■•    1999    " 
jNEVy       ...»#.. 105.O 91.0 33.6 74 P 735 724 69.6     1     7Ü.0     s     Sa.3     i 
k.'SMC   i 16.4 i-i.e 13.5 12^     •     12.5     |     1Z.F?     ;     13 5?     {:     13 C     |     13.?    I 
Hotel 121 .A 105.3 97- 87 0     ■     86.0     :     aä.2           82.7     !     B3.C B1.S     | 
Figure 2.1.      Funding for U.S. Navy Programs, 1991-1999 [From NSB 1998]. 
Acknowledging the need for management reform in the face of strict fiscal 
constraints, the Department of Defense, heeding the advice of management experts, 
launched three major defense reviews to assess force and infrastructure requirements: the 
1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the landmark Quadrennial 
Defense Review, completed in 1997. Infrastructure, as defined by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, is comprised of acquisition, central logistics, central personnel, 
communications, force management, installations, medical functions, quality of life, 
science and technology, and training. 
The Base Force Review and the Bottom-Up Review both determined that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) had excessive infrastructure and, as a result, was unable to 
fund readiness and modernization requirements.   Because of these findings, Congress 
6 
established the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. The Commission was tasked to review 
force structure and make recommendations for changes [GAO 1999]. 
During its review, the Commission noted that infrastructure accounted for over 
half the defense budget.  As part of its conclusions to decrease infrastructure spending, 
the Commission recommended reengineering DoD support organizations and functions. 
It also established the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which required each new 
administration to conduct a comprehensive strategy and force review. The first QDR was 
completed in May 1997.   The QDR conclusions were based on its findings that "DoD 
could not achieve its modernization and readiness goals without a concerted effort to 
reduce infrastructure costs" [GAO 1997].   To achieve this end, the QDR made four 
recommendations, the latter two representing a major departure from traditional defense 
organizational principles and becoming the catalyst to regionalization. 
• Continue reductions in civilian and military personnel associated with 
infrastructure 
• Complete two  additional rounds of base realignments and closures 
(BRAC) 
• Implement major initiatives to reengineer and reinvent DoD support 
functions 
• Increase emphasis on using the private sector to perform non-warfighting 
support functions [GAO 1999] 
Subsequent to the QDR recommendations, the Secretary of Defense 
commissioned the Defense Reform Task Force. The Task Force's purpose was to review 
departmental procedures and discover ways to streamline functions and improve 
efficiency. The Task Force published its report, the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), in 
November 1997, in response to the QDR call for reduced infrastructure.    The DRI 
findings built on the QDR results, establishing four pillars of major reform efforts: 
• Reengineer defense business and support functions, primarily by adopting 
and applying the private sector's best practices 
• Reorganize and reduce the size of DoD headquarters elements and 
Defense agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
• Expand the use of competitive sourcing to open DoD's commercial 
activities to competition from the private sector 
• Conduct two additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds and 
eliminate other facilities that are no longer needed and/or drain resources 
[GAO 1999] 
The DRI began what was termed a Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) by the 
Secretary of Defense. The RBA instituted a new philosophy toward DoD management. 
For the first time, the management emphasis shifted to increasing efficiency by 
redefining and streamlining business functions and performance. However, the DRI 
clearly indicated effectiveness in traditional military support functions should not be 
degraded to achieve efficiency. This emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness would 
become a focal point of the regionalization process in the Navy Region Southwest. 
Because of the importance of these terms in not only regionalization, but 
throughout new DoD management, an understanding of their definitions is appropriate. 
Roberts defines the terms efficiency and effectiveness in Organizational Configurations: 
Efficiency refers to the capacity to produce results with minimum 
expenditure of time, money, or materials. Efficiency thus focuses on the 
input-output ratio. To be efficient is to do things well, to attend to the 
internal organization by refining, routinizing, formalizing, elaborating on 
existing knowledge, and making short-run improvements. Effectiveness, 
on the other hand, is defined as productive of results. The focus is on 
doing the right thing and it is determined by an absolute level of either 
input acquisition or outcome attainment [Roberts 2000]. 
Increasing efficiency requires an in-depth understanding of internal operations, 
while effectiveness requires the ability to understand and interpret the external 
environment and to adapt to its requirements. 
The new DoD management philosophy sought to achieve maximum efficiency 
without sacrificing effectiveness. In government terms, the focus was to maintain, or 
improve, readiness while reducing the infrastructure budget. Regionalization of the 
Navy's shore installation infrastructure was a direct result of the new management 
philosophy and implemented in accordance with recommendations made in these reviews 
and initiatives. 
C.        DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INITIATIVES 
In 1996, the Department of Defense identified an additional annual budgetary 
requirement of $3.5 to 5 billion to fund force recapitalization and modernization in the 
Navy, while maintaining fleet readiness [GAO 1997]. They identified infrastructure 
savings as the source for this funding requirement that, at the time, accounted for 
approximately 40 percent of the annual Navy budget. Figure 2.2 breaks down Navy 
program funding. 
Streamlining the business practices of shore installation support functions through 
regionalization was seen as one of the means to achieve the necessary savings. The 
Committee on Shore Installation Readiness Management summarized the perception. 
"Pressures to [regionalize] come from competition between the need to maintain force 
readiness for the present and the need to modernize systems and technology for the fleet 
of tomorrow." [NSB 1998] At the time, installations accounted for almost twenty percent 
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Figure 2.3.      Navy Infrastructure by Functional Categories [From NSB 1998]. 
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Responding to the need to reduce infrastructure spending, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) initiated a major organizational restructuring of naval shore 
installations. On 23 June 1997, the CNO issued NAVOP 004/97, directing installation 
claimant consolidation and regionalization of installation management functions. The 
CNO's order set the direction for Navy shore installation management for the twenty-first 
century. It is repeated below in its entirety: 
P232110ZJUN97 
FM: CNO WASHINGTON DC ORIG N00 
Subject: REGIONALIZATION// 
UNCLAS    PERSONAL    FOR    COMMANDERS,    COMMANDING 




RMKS/1. AS WE GO FORWARD, ONE OF OUR PRIMARY 
OBJECTIVES MUST BE TO REDUCE THE COST OF OPERATING 
THE NAVY SHORE ESTABLISHMENT SO WE CAN USE THOSE 
SAVINGS FOR PEOPLE/QUALITY OF LIFE, READINESS, AND 
MODERNIZATION. THIS INITIATIVE BEGAN WITH OUR 
REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT OF TWO YEARS AGO. 
WE'RE JUST STARTING TO SEE THOSE EFFORTS COME TO 
FRUITION, AND IT'S TIME NOW TO AGGRESSIVELY AND 
COLLECTIVELY WORK TOGETHER ON OVERALL 
REGIONALIZATION. THE     SAVINGS     FROM     REDUCED 
INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE 
PLAN FOR THE FY99 BUDGET, AND SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION 
OF THE PLAN WILL BE DEPENDENT ON THIS INITIATIVE. 
2. WE HAVE MUCH TO DO AND OUR APPROACH TO 
INFRASTRUCTURE COST REDUCTION SHOULD CENTER ON 
TWO FUNDAMENTALS: 
A. REGIONALIZING INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (IM) 
FUNCTIONS   IN   SHORE  CONCENTRATION  AREAS:     BY  SO 
11 
DOING, WE WOULD ELIMINATE REDUNDANT 
FUNCTIONS/ORGANIZATIONS AND STREAMLINE REMAINING 
FUNCTIONS THROUGH STANDARDIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, 
AND ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY OVERHEAD COSTS. 
ALSO, WE COULD IDENTIFY THOSE REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE 
ESSENTIAL TO MISSION SUCCESS AND MEET THOSE 
REQUIREMENTS THROUGH OPTIONS THAT RESULT IN BEST 
VALUE FOR NAVY. IN IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES TO 
REGIONALIZE, WE MUST TAKE A BROAD VIEW OF IM, 
INCLUDING SUCH FUNCTIONS AS AIR OPERATIONS, PORT 
SERVICES AND ADP, IN ADDITION TO BASE OPERATING 
SUPPORT (BOS) SERVICES SUCH AS REAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, BACHELOR QUARTERS, AND SECURITY. 
B. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CLAIMANTS IN THE IM 
BUSINESS: CLAIMANT CONSOLIDATION WOULD ALLOW 
SMALLER CLAIMANTS TO FOCUS ON THEIR PRIMARY MISSION 
WHILE LARGER CLAIMANTS, INCLUDING THE FLEETS, WOULD 
PROVIDE IM SERVICES TO TENANT ACTIVITIES WITHIN A 
REGION. INSTALLATION CLAIMANT CONSOLIDATION WOULD 
FACILITATE REGIONALIZATION AND REDUCE 
ECHELON ONE AND TWO IM STAFFS. SUCH REALIGNMENTS 
WOULD ALSO ALLOW THE REMAINING CLAIMANT SERVICE 
PROVIDERS TO BE MORE COMPETITIVE AS WE EXPLORE 
OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS. 
3. THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN 
THE TOTAL COST SAVINGS NEEDED TO SUPPORT OUR FORCE 
STRUCTURE. MANY POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS LIE OUTSIDE OUR 
PURVIEW. WE CAN ACHIEVE NEEDED SAVINGS ONLY 
THROUGH REGIONALLY FOCUSED ANALYSES DEVELOPED 
THROUGH THE ACTIVE AND COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION 
OF REGIONAL COMMANDERS, LOCAL COMMANDING 
OFFICERS, LEAD FLEET/MAJOR CLAIMANTS AND OPNAV. AS 
THE RESULT OF ONE SUCH EFFORT, CINCPACFLT AND 
COMNAVBASE SAN DIEGO ARE NOW IMPLEMENTING IM 
REGIONALIZATION     IN     SAN     DIEGO. CINCLANTFLT, 
CINCPACFLT AND CNET REGIONALIZATION ANALYSES ARE 
ALSO ONGOING AT OTHER LOCATIONS. SIGNIFICANT 
POTENTIAL SAVINGS ARE BEING IDENTIFIED PARTICULARLY 
WHEN BOS SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE CONSOLIDATED. 
4. OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REGIONALIZATION ARE 
CLEAR: 
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- NO TENANT SHOULD DO WHAT A HOST COMMAND CAN DO. 
- NO HOST SHOULD DO WHAT A REGIONAL COMPLEX CAN DO. 
- NO REGIONAL COMPLEX SHOULD DO WHAT THE 
SURROUNDING COMMUNITY CAN DO MORE COST 
EFFECTIVELY. 
- THE NUMBER OF HOST COMMANDS AND TENANTS 
PROVIDING SERVICES SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THE 
MINIMUM. 
5. INITIATIVES TO REDUCE INFRASTRUCTURE ARE SENSITIVE 
ISSUES    BOTH   HERE   IN   WASHINGTON   AND   IN   LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES, THUS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CAREFULLY 
ARTICULATE THESE CONCEPTS.   WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO 
ENSURE THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN 
"LOOKING   AT/STUDYING/ANALYZING"   A   PARTICULAR   IM 
FUNCTION, AND "EXECUTING/REALIGNING/RESTRUCTURING". 
CONFLICTING    INFORMATION    PROVIDED    AT    DIFFERENT 
LEVELS   OF   THE   CHAIN  OF  COMMAND  CAUSES   SERIOUS 
CONFUSION     AND     MAY     DELAY     IMPLEMENTING     THE 
INITIATIVES SUPPORTED BY OUR ANALYSIS. ALL LEVELS OF 
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND SHOULD BE SUPPORTING THESE 
EFFORTS FOR ALL THE SAME REASONS, AND GUIDANCE MUST 
BE CLEAR AND PROPERLY COORDINATED.    AT THE SAME 
TIME, SENIOR LEADERS WITHIN EACH REGION MUST ENSURE 
THAT PRINCIPALS WITHIN THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES ARE 
INFORMED  AND  INVOLVED  IN  CREATING  A  MORE  COST 
EFFECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE.     IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD 
THAT THERE IS STRENGTH IN REGIONALIZATION.  THE MORE 
EFFICIENT AREAS ARE, THE MORE SOLID THEIR FOUNDATION. 
6. WE MUST BUILD UPON THE SUCCESSES OF OTHER 
REGIONAL EFFORTS SUCH AS IN MAINTENANCE AND FISC 
PARTNERING. HOWEVER, THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS, WE 
MUST CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF REGIONALIZATION 
INITIATIVES ON HOMEBASING, SEA/SHORE ROTATION AND 
OTHER PROGRAMS CRITICAL TO THE RETENTION OF OUR 
HIGHLY TRAINED AND SKILLED PERSONNEL, ENSURING THAT 
OUR EFFORTS DO NOT RESULT IN OUR SAILORS OR CIVILIANS 
BEING ASKED TO DO MORE WITH LESS. I ASK FOR THE 
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT OF ALL COMMANDS AS 
WE WORK TOGETHER TO REALIGN SHORE INFRASTRUCTURE 
WHERE IT MAKES SENSE. YOUR ACTIVE SUPPORT AND BEST 
EFFORTS WILL BE CRITICAL TO OUR SUCCESS. 
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7. RELEASED BY ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, CNO.// [CNO 1997] 
In his message to Navy leadership, the CNO established two goals that would 
fundamentally  change the traditional  shore  infrastructure  organization:  regionalize 
installation management (IM) functions in shore concentration areas; and, reduce the 
number of claimants in the IM business. Four guiding principles of regionalization were 
established and quickly became the regionalization watchwords: "no tenant should do 
what a host command can do; no host should do what a regional complex can do; no 
regional complex should do what the surrounding community can do more cost 
effectively; and, the number of host commands and tenants providing services should be 
reduced to a minimum" [CNO 1997]. Having established the goals and the principles by 
which   regional   commanders   were   to   operate,   the   CNO   clearly   indicated   that 
regionalization should strive to accomplish cost savings through increased efficiency, but 
not at the expense of readiness or personnel quality of life. 
Immediately following the implementation message, the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations published the 21s' Century Shore Support Infrastructure Vision & 
Strategic Plan (SSVIP) [Appendix A] that provided the framework for regionalization: 
Over the past 20 years, the changing international geopolitical and threat 
environment has prompted considerable shifts in the size and structure of 
our military forces. The prevalent philosophy of streamlining and 
realigning has worked its way through the Services: more weapons 
systems are operated by leaner, more efficient, and cost-effective 
infrastructure. We must learn to run our "businesses" much as the private 
sector does - with a minimum of duplication and red tape and a maximum 
of service and responsiveness. To date, although we have been 
successfully streamlining our force structure, the same cannot be said for 
the associated infrastructure. One cannot move ahead while the other lags 
behind [SSIVSP 1997]. 
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The CNO's strategic plan identified two strategic issues: apply state-of-the- 
market business practices and reduce infrastructure cost; and the accomplishments, goals 
and objectives with which to address them. Appendix A lists the strategic plan in its 
entirety. 
Having set the direction for BOS regionalization, the CNO delegated 
responsibility for implementation to the regional officers. Because San Diego area 
installation leaders had already begun coordinating the regionalization of common 
support functions as early as 1996, Navy Region Southwest became the Navy pilot site 
for BOS regionalization. The following chapter discusses the implementation process in 
the Navy Region Southwest. 
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III.    NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the regionalization process in Navy Region Southwest and 
the goals of the Region's leadership. It details the implementation process, and then 
describes the current state of the Region. It concludes with a description of the change in 
leadership roles and responsibilities in the Region resulting from regionalization. 
B. NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST (NRSW) 
The Path Forward 
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Figure 3.1.      Regionalization Timeline in NRSW [From CNRSW 2001]. 
1.        Regionalization Background 
As shown in Figure 3.1, installation leaders in the San Diego fleet concentration 
area began examining the possibility of regionalizing support functions as early as 1996. 
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As a means of identifying potential functions to be consolidated, installation leaders 
conducted several Streamlined Business Case Analyses (SBCA), identifying 34 
functions, or business lines, in shore installation management (i.e., Port Operations, Air 
Operations, Housing, Logistics, Food Services, etc.) that could achieve significant 
savings through regional consolidation of specific functions [CNRSW 2001]. The 
findings were reported to the Deputy CNO for Logistics (OPNAV N4), who approved the 
recommendations contained in the SBCA for immediate implementation in the San Diego 
region on 10 October 1996.1 
OPNAV N4 designated the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT), to lead the implementation and directed the following geographic 
consolidation for the San Diego Metro area: 
Creation of three geographic hosts: Mainside, Point Loma, and Coronado 
Transfer of all installation management functions to the three geographic 
hosts 
Designation of CINCPACFLT hosts for each of the three geographic hosts 
Transfer of all class 1 and 2 real property ownership in San Diego to 
CINCPACFLT 
CINCPACFLT   to   develop   specific   staffing   requirements   for   the 
reorganization [DCNO 1996] 
Additionally, OPNAV N4 directed that the following functions be either 
regionalized or consolidated in the San Diego Metro area [DCNO 1996]. Regionalization 
was directed for Bachelor Quarters; Base Security; Environment, as long as no 
commanding officer was placed in legal jeopardy; Food Services (galleys); and Safety, as 
long as responsibility versus control issues could be addressed.    Consolidation was 
' Appendix B lists a completed SBCA for Base Security as reference. 
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directed   for   Freight   Transportation,   Mail   Services,   and   Resource   Management 
(comptrollers). 
Having previously determined a need to streamline business functions throughout 
the region, and with several specific functions already regionalized or consolidated, when 
the CNO's directive to regionalize BOS functions was issued, San Diego installations 
already had the processes in place to aide in the transition. On 1 October 1998, 
Commander Naval Base, San Diego, became Commander Navy Region Southwest. 
2.        Regional Area 
Area of Responsibility 
NAS Fallon 
NAS Lemoore   
Naval Base 
Ventura County 
- CBC Port Hueneme 
- NAS Pt Mugu 
NWS Seat Beach 
- Fallbrook 
- Seal Beach    — 
- Concord 
FISC * PSA 
SWDIV * NAVMEDCEN 
PWC * NCTS 
Naval Base Coronado 
- NAS North Island 
- NAB Coronado 
- OLF Imperial Beach 
- San Clemente Island 
Naval Base San Diego 
-NAVSTA32ndSt V 
- Broadway Complex 
Naval Base Point Loma 
-SUBASE ) 
- Fleet ASW Base 
- SPAWAR 
NAF El Centra 
Figure 3.2.      Southwest Region Area of Responsibility [From CNRS W 2001 ]. 
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The Navy Region Southwest headquarters is located in San Diego, California, and 
includes the states of California, Arizona, and Nevada.    Figure 3.2 summarizes the 
geographic area of responsibility.   Regional bases are divided into two "sub-regions," 
Metro and Over-the-horizon (OTH).   Metro, as is indicated by the star in Figure 3.2, 
consists of three "megabases," Naval Base Coronado, Naval Base Point Loma, and Naval 
Base San Diego and was the focus of the initial regionalization process in October 1998. 
OTH includes all bases that are not located in the San Diego metropolitan area, including 
two "megabases," Naval Base Ventura County, and Naval Weapons Station Seal Beal, as 
well as Naval Air Facility El Centro, Naval Air Station Lemoore, and Naval Air Station 
Fallon, NV.   OTH bases were brought into the region beginning October 1999.   Three 
California-based naval activities were not incorporated into the Southwest Region: Naval 
Postgraduate  School   (NPS)  Monterey,  NAWS   China  Lake,  and NAWS  Corona. 
However, these bases do receive regional support from the Human Resources Support 
Center (HRSC), located in San Diego.    The asterisks in Figure 3.2 indicate other 
commands that also receive regional support. 
3. Regionalized Support Functions 
Regional management in the NRSW realigned base operating support (BOS) from 
geographical footprints (installations) to functional areas managed across the entire 
region.    The NRSW provides coordination of base operating support functions for 
operating forces throughout the region, providing expertise in areas such as port services, 
air services, family services, environmental, logistical services, bachelor quarters, family 
housing, medical and security. The purpose of consolidating common support functions 
was to reduce regional infrastructure costs through scale economies, scope economies, 
redundancy elimination, and market leverage [NSB 1998]. 
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Figure 3.3.      The Galactic Radiator [From CNRSW 2001]. 
4.        Regional Matrix Organization 
Commander,   Navy   Region   Southwest   (CNRSW),   is   tasked   to   provide 
consolidated base operations support as defined by the Core Business Model; to own and 
provide facility and land space management within its designated region and Navy 
concentration area; to exercise coordination and command of assigned shore 
organizations; to provide support to home ported and transient ships, submarines and 
aircraft, afloat and ashore tenants, and military personnel and family members [SORM 
1999]. To facilitate accomplishing these missions, the region adopted a Matrix 
Organizational Structure, shown in Figure 3.3. 
The NRSW matrix  organization was  designed  to  conform to  CNO N46 
installation management accounting project (IMAP) core business model guidelines. 
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Termed the "Galactic Radiator" by regional personnel, the three-dimensional matrix 
model departed from traditional Navy organizational structure by adopting a business 
orientation towards shore infrastructure management. 
C.        GOALS 
In order to accomplish the CNO's strategic goals for regionalization, CNRSW 
established the primary regional goal: achieve ME20 - Most Efficient & Effective 
Organization. The following excerpts from the Navy Region Southwest Standard 
Organization and Responsibilities Manual (SORM) outline the mission, vision, and 
guiding principles for the region and how they may serve to accomplish ME20: 
COMNAVREGSW MISSION STATEMENT 
MISSION, VISION AND GUIDANCE. WE ARE A REGIONAL TEAM 
DEDICATED TO PROVIDING THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF BASE 
OPERATING SUPPORT AND QUALITY OF LIFE SERVICES FOR 
ALL OPERATING FORCES AND SHORE ACTIVITIES IN THE 
NAVY SOUTHWEST REGION. 
COMNAVREGSW VISION STATEMENT 
WE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS THE LEADER IN SHORE 
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT. ONE TEAM, ONE VOICE, ONE 
MISSION. 
COMNAVREGSW GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
1. WE ARE A TEAM: 
As a team, we maintain a regional perspective. In a spirit of cooperation, 
we pool our resources and direct investment effectively to meet the needs 
of our customers and stakeholders region-wide. 
2. WE ARE BOUND BY PARTNERSHIPS: 
Our team is founded on partnerships and the continuous, effective 
communication that these partnerships foster. Communication is an 
essential element to resolve cross-functional issues and to effect 
improvement and change. 
3. WE VALUE OUR CUSTOMERS AND OUR STAKEHOLDERS: 
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We maintain strong partnerships with our customers and stakeholders. 
We request customer feedback and measure customer satisfaction. We are 
friends with our communities and to the environment. We respect our 
employees, train them well, and empower them to perform their duties. 
4. WE ARE DEDICATED TO QUALITY AND BEST VALUE: 
We respond to customer feedback to provide the best quality service at the 
best price. We set high standards. We measure our costs and 
continuously seek ways to provide better value. We compete and privatize 
services that can be performed better and at lower cost outside of our 
organization. 
5. WE EMBRACE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND CHANGE: 
We embrace change that benefits our organization and our customers. We 
benchmark and employ private business practices that make us a better 
organization. We seek and employ those technologies that allow us to 
perform most efficiently and effectively [SORM 1999]. 
D.        ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. Chain of Command 
Under the matrix organizational model, BOS and internal support functions are 
managed regionally in support of the CNRSW mission. While the matrix organization is 
a non-linear structure, with members sharing common goals throughout the region, 
leadership roles are well defined. Many regional staff members at all management levels 
throughout the organization are dual-hatted, having regional duties as well as installation 
duties. This is most visible at the functional program level. 
Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS), most of whom are also installation 
commanding officers (CO), direct regional general policy, plans and resource allocation 
for functional programs under their cognizance, as well as performing their assigned CO 
duties. Regional ACOS include: ACOS Logistics, also CO Fleet Industrial Supply 
Center (FISC) and regional Business Manager; ACOS Facilities, also CO, Public Works 
Command; ACOS Infrastructure Planning, also CO, Engineering Field Division (EFD); 
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ACOS Support Services; ACOS Information Technology (IT), also CO, Naval Computer 
and Telecommunications Station; ACOS Force Protection, also CO, NAF El Centro; 
ACOS Air Operations, also CO, NAS Lemoore; ACOS Weapons, also CO, NWS Seal 
Beach; ACOS Port Operations, also CO, NB San Diego; ACOS Ranges, also CO, NAS 
Fallon; ACOS Environment/Safety, also CO, NB Point Loma; ACOS Medical, also CO, 
Naval Medical Center; and ACOS Dental, also CO, Naval Dental Center. 
Program Managers (PM) set requirements, policies and plans for each functional 
program within ACOS jurisdiction. The region has established 27 programs, as listed in 
Figure  3.3.     Program  Site Managers manage functional programs locally at the 
installations, working for both the PM and the installation CO as storefront managers. 
The CO exercises local operational control of Program Site Managers, who report 
Additional Duty (ADDU) to the CO, and directs the efforts of local functional programs, 
consistent  with policies  set  by  the  ACOS,  to  achieve  the  mission and  support 
requirements of the installation.     Coordination of BOS  functions occurs at each 
installation under the auspices of the installation CO, however, the CO no longer controls 
allocation of resources or levels of service for BOS functions.    This represents a 
significant change in Navy organizational culture.  The CO has remained the direct link 
to the customer at their respective installations [SORM 1999]. Figure 3.4 highlights the 
interconnectivity of the ACOS/PM, CO, and site managers under the region's "balanced 
approach" to shore installation business management. 
Directors (Admin, PAO, etc., see Figure 3.3) manage regional programs for their 
respective support functions, providing internal support to the organization. The 
Regional  Business  Manager  monitors,   facilitates   and  promotes  business  process 
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reengineering within the region and, with the assistance of the Financial Officer, oversees 
regional resource management [SORM 1999]. 
The regional Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is similar in structure and 
function to a corporate board, evaluating and recommending policy and plans to the 
regional commander.2 The Customer Advisory Board (CAB) is an executive link to 
stakeholders and customers within the region and provides a forum to address customer 
issues.3 
"A Balanced Approach" 
One Team, One Voice, One Mission 
•   CO... Responsibility, authority, 
accountability... Using regional resources... 
consistent with regional policy 
- On site execution responsibility 
- Responsible for mission performance 
- Customer advocate 
- Ensure standards are met 
- Cross functional management 
- Chain of Command for Military 
Functional Site Manager 
- Reports to both ACOS & CO 
- DH/DIVO Equivalent 
- Manage functional program 
- Responsible geographically 
- Site specific resource 
requirements 
- Site specific program metrics 
ACOS / Director 
-   Policy & Oversight 
•  Program Manager 
- Customer Service 
- Allocation of resources 
- Program policy & standards 
- Technical expertise 
- Technical subject & specific 
training 
- Service provider 
Figure 3.4.      The Balanced Approach [From CNRSW 2001]. 
2
 ESC consists of CNRSW, Deputy CNRSW, Business Manager, Comptroller, ACOS's, installation COs, and 
Directors. 
3
 CAB consists of senior regional representatives and major stakeholders (AIRPAC, SURFPAC, etc) and 
customers. 
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2. Resource Management 
Due to the nature of the Navy's mission, most naval bases and facilities are 
geographically collocated in a few coastal regions. Prior to regionalization, each base 
operated independently of each other, facilities were subordinate units of parent 
commands, and most maintained independent financial accountability for budget 
allocation, often providing all infrastructure support internally. 
Decades of this independent organizational structure led to the development of a 
financial mindset termed a "rice bowl mentality." Bases commanders submitted their 
annual budget requirements directly to CINCPACFLT and made autonomous decisions 
as to how the funds received would be distributed, regardless of requirements or 
shortfalls at other bases in the region. In short, they were only concerned with the rice in 
their own bowls. 
Financial restructuring under regionalization consolidated and standardized the 
flow of BOS funding under CNRSW, as depicted in Figure 3.5. NRSW receives BOS 
funding for all activities in the region from CINCPACFLT. Accountability and 
responsibility for expenditure under the new organization shifted from the installation 
COs to the Regional Commander. CNRSW assumed 31 U.S. Code Anti-deficiency Act 
Section 1517 authority and became personally accountable for over obligation of funds. 
Operational funding was not affected and still flows directly to deployable units 
via Type Commanders. A notable exception is Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 
Department (AMD) funding. CINCPACFLT provides AIMD funding to Commander, 
Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (CNAP). CNAP retains Anti-deficiency Act Section 
1517 authority for these funds, but must transfer funds to CNRSW for distribution, as 
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AIMD is considered an infrastructure support function.    Figure 3.6 summarizes the 
relationship. 
Funds Flow: CPF-N46 BOS 
Perspective Today 
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Figure 3.5.      BOS Funding Flow [From CNRSW 2001]. 
27 







AIR WINGS CARRIERS CARRIER AIRWINGS 
*A1MD Funding includes AOM and BOS funds for AIMD support. 
Figure 3.6.      AIMD Funding and Reporting Diagram [From Interview 15]. 
E.        CURRENT STATUS 
As stated earlier in the chapter, regionalization of infrastructure support functions 
sought to reduce costs through increased leverage and economies and reduced 
redundancies. Consolidating all installation support function funding under regional 
control gathered all the separate rice bowls into one common bowl, providing over $650 
million in market leverage. Regional financial personnel determined additional savings 
of at least $40 million could be realized through the efficiencies provided by the 
streamlined funding flow [NSB 1998]. In an effort to assess the outcomes of the 
regionalization process in the Navy Region Southwest, in terms of cost savings and 
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increased efficiencies, the following chapters present a data analysis of the current status 
of regionalization. 
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IV.    METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of data collected through interviews and 
document review. It explains the purpose of the analysis and the methodology, describes 
the interview and data collection process, and presents the data analysis. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE ANALYSIS 
The top leader of an organization is responsible for relating an organization to its 
external environment and vice versa [Thompson 1967]. While most organizations are, to 
some degree, adept at internal assessments, rarely are senior leadership or employees 
effective at external scanning. "As a result, most organizations are like ships trying to 
navigate treacherous waters without the benefit of human lookouts, radar, or sonar" 
[Bryson 1995]. An analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) 
provides a simple tool to effectively assess both the environment within the organization 
and the external environment facing the organization. As Bryson states: 
Any effective response to threats and opportunities must be based on an 
intimate knowledge of the organization's strengths and weaknesses. 
Effective responses build on strengths and minimize or overcome 
weaknesses in order to take advantage of opportunities and minimize or 
overcome threats. 
Strengths and weaknesses are typically internal and refer to the present state of 
the organization.  Opportunities and threats are typically external and future-oriented in 
nature. However, when examining an organization's SWOT, it is important to remember 
that the distinctions between internal, external, present and future-oriented are fluid 
[Bryson 1995]. 
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SWOT analysis allows leaders to understand their internal and external contexts 
to make effective strategic decisions about their future. It is essential that organizational 
leaders understand how they have arrived at their current organizational state in order to 
accurately determine the appropriate actions to take to ensure they achieve their future 
goals.  SWOT analysis provides the tool to accomplish this.  Strategic planners examine 
past organizational performance over a specific period and then identify the strengths and 
weaknesses surrounding that performance.    Once the strengths and weaknesses are 
defined, the teams identify the potential opportunities and threats facing the organization. 
This method allows the teams to more accurately determine the issues facing their 
organization and the appropriate actions to ensure the proper future course to achieve 
their goals. 
In the case of NRSW, the strategic issues were established by the CNO in his 21st 
Century Shore Support Infrastructure Vision and Strategic Plan [Appendix A]: apply 
state-of-the-art business practices and reduce infrastructure costs. As stated in Chapter I, 
the focus of this research is to assess the current status of the NRSW. Identifying threats 
and opportunities facing the Region and developing strategies to manage them are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, a modified SWOT analysis was performed, 
examining the current state of the Region by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Region's performance over the 18 months following the Chief of Naval Operations 
mandate to regionalize shore installation management functions.    By examining the 
strengths and weaknesses of the regionalization process, as viewed by key senior regional 
managers, the analysis is able to determine if the NRSW has met the objectives set forth 
by the CNO to reduce infrastructure costs through increased efficiency. 
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C.       SWOT DATA COLLECTION Methodology 
1.        Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol was designed to allow maximum flexibility to both the 
researchers gathering the data and to the interviewees. The quantity and quality of the 
corporate knowledge resident in the senior staff of both the CNRSW and CNAP is 
exceptional. With that in mind, interviews were conducted that would allow a free flow 
of information, and not constrain the regionalization process experts to a small set of 
questions. This gave the respondents the opportunity to discuss topics they felt were 
most important. In this way, a wide range of data was collected related to the 
regionalization process, including successes and issues. 
2. Interview and SWOT Methodology 
Semi-structured  interviews   were   conducted  with   14   CNRSW  and  CNAP 
personnel, 10 regional staff members and four AIRPAC staff members. The average 
interview time was two hours, with both researchers present at all interviews. The 
interview group included eight senior naval officers, Commanders and Captains, with an 
average of over twenty years of service, and six senior civilian Government Service (GS) 
personnel, GS-14 and GS-15, each with over 25 years of experience in public service, 
and at least 15 years working for the Navy in the San Diego Metro area. 
Informal interviews were conducted with 12 mid-level civilian and military staff 
members, who worked at tenant commands, but also performed regional staff duties, as 
their Commanding Officers were also Assistant Chiefs of Staff.  These interviews were 
conducted both in small groups and singularly and included two junior military officers, 
and ten mid-level civilians, GS-8 to GS-11. 
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Upon completion of the interviews, the information was reviewed for relevance, 
key points were transcribed, then applicable regional literature and financial data were 
gathered to aid in a thorough content analysis. A response was deemed relevant if at least 
seventy-five percent of the respondents highlighted similar issues, or if regional literature 
consistently supported or reinforced information gathered in the interviews. During the 
content analysis phase, the interview and document data were grouped into strengths and 
weaknesses, that were further organized into common themes that the Southwest Region 
leadership faces in order to accomplish its mission. 
D.       DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Presentation Format 
The data analysis presented below is organized first into two main categories: 
strengths and weaknesses.    The main categories are then further organized into four 
common themes:  Matrix Organizational Structure, Leadership and Communication, 
Measuring Infrastructure Cost Savings, and Customer Service.   An additional theme is 
added to weaknesses to address a specific research issue: NAS North Island AIMD 
Budget Base Transfer.    Each category begins with interview comments in italics, 
summarized and edited for presentation purposes, then presents supporting documentary 
data. 
2. Strengths 
a.        Matrix Organizational Structure 
Regional Staff comments: 
Prior to regionalization, San Diego had 32 Fort Apaches. After the 
restructuring, all the bases in the Region are learning to cooperate and 
support one another. 
The matrix is adaptable. We can rearrange or realign reporting 
relationships as the Region evolves. 
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Program Managers have become a regional auditing arm of sorts, 
overseeing base expenditures in their programs to ensure funds are spent 
wisely. 
As an ACOS and a CO, it is my responsibility not only to ensure my base 
receives the support it needs, but also to ensure that all bases throughout 
the Region receive the support they need from my Program Managers. 
Installation CO comments: 
Commanding Officers are now more powerful...we make decisions that 
influence policy across the entire Region. 
Regional BOS support through program managers is a paradigm shift for 
COs who are used to [as operational commanders] being responsible for 
every single aspect of their command. With time, the reporting 
relationships under the matrix organization will be viewed as standard 
operating procedure at shore installations. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the new regional structure.   According to a regional 
staff member, this new structure was adopted in response to feedback from COs.   The 
realignment moves COs to the top of the matrix and the ACOS to the side, bringing all 
COs into the regional organization. In the previous structure, depicted in Figure 3.3, only 
those COs who were ACOS were integrated into the Region, the remaining COs were 
considered  customers.     The  staff member noted that this  simple  change  in  an 
organizational chart weaves the COs into the matrix, rather than listing them as outliers 
on the old chart. 
In discussing the auditing aspect of program managers, a regional official 
cited the example of a small, over-the-horizon base that had enjoyed a $40,000 travel 
budget prior to regionalization.   After the base was integrated into the Region and the 
travel budgets were consolidated, base officials submitted a $7000 travel request to send 
a member, who was not a cook, to a New York culinary school.   The PM denied the 
request, citing unjustified use of funds. 
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Figure 4.1.      New Matrix Organization [From CNRSW 2001]. 
Assistant Chiefs of Staff are responsible for assessing the conditional 
readiness of the facilities under their cognizance and for prioritizing funding 
requirements across their programs. The cumulative result of ACOS prioritization of 
need within their programs is the Integrated Priority List (IPL). The IPL sets regional 
priorities for funding, by determining urgency of need. 
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One regional official highlighted the benefits of the new organizational 
structure with the  following  example.  Before regionalization, Naval Facility  San 
Clemente Island's pier and several buildings had fallen into disrepair.   San Clemente 
Island was considered an aviation activity and as such, funding priorities were given to 
aviation mission-related discrepancies. This year, San Clemente Island has been brought 
under the regional umbrella.    ACOS Air Operations has assumed oversight for all 
aviation-related issues, however, since ACOS Port Operations is responsible to ensure 
that all piers throughout the Region are maintained properly and ACOS Facilities is 
responsible for all facilities, they now also must include San Clemente Island repairs 
when considering their list of priorities. 
b.        Leadership and Communication 
Regional staff comments: 
This Region was spawned by good communication and now information 
technology and the World Wide Web are building on that foundation. 
Regional staff members are experts in shore installation management. 
Roles and responsibilities have been clearly defined. Communication in a 
matrix organization is crucial. 
Examples   of   the   Region's   web-based   information   sharing   and 
communication include the OPNAV-N46 Clearinghouse SIM Information Website, and 
the Region's new Knowledge Management (KM) portal. A contract was established with 
Oracle, Inc., to conduct region-wide Knowledge Management education and training and 
to integrate Advanced Information Technology (IT) Web applications into a Portal/Data 
Sharing Environment. Advanced IT has also provided video teleconferencing resources, 
allowing officials to communicate across regions and to address common issues. 
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The Region has adopted a Balanced Approach concept discussed in 
Chapter III, that established and defined operating and reporting relationships between 
COs, ACOS/PMs, and Functional Site Managers (Figure 3.4). 
The Region's Executive Steering Committee provides a monthly forum 
for senior regional staff to discuss issues and formulate strategies and has been likened to 
a corporate board meeting, by several regional staff members. The Customer Advisory 
Board is a similar body that provides for communication between senior regional officials 
and key stakeholders and customers throughout the Region. 
c.        Measuring Infrastructure Cost Savings 
Regional Staff comments: 
Comptroller reorganization into one regional office provides budgetary 
oversight across the Region and more accurate control of BOS funds. 
Prior to regionalization, fences prevented economies of scale. 
We have closed a base without a BRAC.4   That is a documented cost 
saving. 
TREX will give the Region the ability to track every dollar. 
Several officials noted that with BOS funds controlled at the regional 
level, they were able to achieve economies of scale through consolidation of redundant 
base support service contracts into a single regional contract.  Examples of consolidated 
contracts include food service for galleys and clubs, dog food for military working dogs, 
chapel bulletin software, and gym equipment. 
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Figure 4.2.      FTE Reductions [From CNRSW 2001]. 
Due to Office of Personnel Management reporting requirements, civilian 
personnel cost savings can be captured accurately by measuring Full Time Equivalents 
(FTE). Figure 4.2 indicates that from FY96 to FYOO, FTE were reduced by 1103. In 
FYOO, Seal Beach and Ventura were added to the Region, increasing the FTE by 1000, 
however, with the scheduled reductions, total FTE is forecast to be 2131, an overall 
reduction from FY96 of 779 FTE, despite the addition of the OTH installations. This 
demonstrates that, without a BRAC, through the regionalization process, the Region's 
total FTE elimination equates to the closure of an entire naval shore installation. 
Regional savings in BOS direct funding totaled $20,465,000 in 2001 over 
the previous year [CNRSW RM 2001].   Specific savings include recurring savings of 
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over $4 million in both Port Ops and MWR as a result of FTE reductions and contract 
consolidations [Interviews 10 and 11]. 
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Figure 4.3.      TREX System [From www.cnrsw.navy.mil]. 
NRSW staff developed the Total Region Execution System (TREX), a 
web-enabled knowledge management platform for financial, personnel, and business 
processes within the NRSW that provides a single source business application framework 
to assist in determining budgetary and readiness requirements (Figure 4.3). 
d. Customer Service 
Regional Staff comments: 
40 
Having a regional office provides constancy of purpose to the programs. 
For example, a Sailor can walk into any club, BEQ, or port facility in the 
Region and expect the same level of service anywhere he goes. 
We are rapidly becoming experts at assessing customer satisfaction levels. 
Regionalization has allowed redistribution of wealth to the needy. The 
"Haves" are now sharing with the "Have-nots." 
One regional official explained the redistribution of wealth concept with 
the following illustration.   NAVBASE San Diego has traditionally been the highest 
grossing MWR facility in the Navy. Reorganization of the MWR assets under a regional 
MWR Program Manager has allowed a redistribution of funding to bases that lack 
sufficient MWR funds, ensuring all customers receive similar levels of service.    A 
poignant example of this concept of the "haves" sharing with the "have-nots" is the 
reprogramming of funds from NAVBASE San Diego Golf Course profits to fund 
construction of a new youth center at NAS Lemoore. The new youth center will replace 
a building that was so small that a tent was erected next to it to handle the overflow of 
children. A fan was placed in the tent to provide cooling in the desert heat. 
Regional staff members described numerous instances of constancy of 
purpose. Support Services personnel have established baseline criteria for customer 
service throughout their programs. Housing Office personnel ensure all houses offered to 
military members are of like quality independent of geographic location [Interview 9]. 
MWR personnel have standardized prices and food quality in clubs and galleys 
throughout the Region [Interview 10]. Customer satisfaction surveys conducted through 
Support Services indicate that customer satisfaction levels are high for these programs. 
Customer satisfaction surveys are used to measure program effectiveness 
throughout the Region.  Most programs conduct them quarterly. Program Managers are 
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accountable to their ACOS, as well as the Executive Steering Committee, whose 
members monitor and evaluate all customer feedback. 
3.        Weaknesses 
a.        Matrix Organizational Structure 
Regional Staff comments: 
There is no feeling of ownership among the Commanding Officers...it 
will take two to three more COs before that changes. 
Accountability and responsibility are blurred in a matrix organization. 
Fences are organized along very archaic lines. 
The matrix organization, coupled with wide geographic dispersion, 
presents the greatest challenge. Coordination and teambuilding are 
complicated and time consuming. 
NPC can't understand this structure; they eliminated two of the Region's 
security chief billets that were essential to the commands. 
Regional Tenant Command Staff comments: 
Regionalization institutionalized stovepiping. 
Officials complained that reprogramming of funds, even as little as $100, 
is very difficult in the matrix organization. While the traditional Navy stovepipe 
structure has been eliminated, some feel the matrix structure creates its own program 
stovepipes. To move money from one program to another, the approval chain must flow 
through the Program Manager, to the ACOS, often up to the Admiral, then through the 
same chain in the program receiving funds. All officials must agree, or the 
reprogramming can experience serious delays, or be disapproved. 
One official noted the problem of the performance appraisal reporting 
chain of command.   In the matrix organization, many of the Functional Site Managers 
have two reporting seniors: the base CO and the ACOS/PM. The PM has additional duty 
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(ADDU) fiscal and policy control over the Site Managers, while the CO has physical, 
primary control (PRIDU). Supervisors of civilian and military personnel have a fiduciary 
responsibility to observe the performance of the individual prior to submitting 
performance appraisals. This has been difficult because of the geographic separation 
between the PMs and Site Managers. Initially, the base CO submitted input to the report 
to the ACOS/PM for final signature; however, recent changes have made the CO 
responsible for the final submission, with a concurrent report submitted by the ACOS/PM 
only if there is a difference of opinion between the two reporting seniors. 
Naval Personnel Command (NPC) has been unable to adjust to regional 
matrix organizational personnel requirements. The new structure realigned billets under 
program unit identification codes (UICs) vice installation UICs. The NPC billet 
assignment process was not adjusted, causing erroneous billet reductions across the 
region. In one case, regional security had three E-7 security chief billets, one in Metro 
and two in over-the horizon locations. The NPC computer saw a two-billet surplus in the 
security program UIC and eliminated the two extra billets. NPC tracking programs do 
not have the capability to identify that the billets actually supported three separate 
geographic locations. 
b.        Leadership and Communication 
Regional staff comments: 
The definition of regionalization is half the people doing four times the 
work, with a fraction of the money. 
Regionalization is a farce, we have to work two jobs, but aren't given the 
money to do even one properly. We have less money now than we did 
before regionalization, but our workloads have multiplied. 
43 
An employee satisfaction survey conducted in October 2000 indicated that 
the perceptions of supervisors and employees about the Region were not as favorable as 
those of senior leaders. The eight major categories of the survey were Work Team 
Functioning, Job Characteristics, Worker Motivation, General Organizational Climate, 
Leadership, Process Improvement, Support for Process Improvement, and Training 
Support. The survey results noted, "Survey questions do not reflect the working reality 
of the Region. The truth is in the comments." The following are excerpts from those 
comments [CNRSW 2000]. 
• Work Team Functioning 
We are cut and bleeding - cut to the bone and are then expected to meet 
the needs of the safety and welfare of a difficult population. 
We are tired, we are burned out, and we are spread too thin to get the job 
done. 
• Job Characteristics 
Perhaps you should get the word out to the troops that you are not just 
some acronym, some set of initials. If you play such a large part in our 
lives, just who the heck are you? 
We are not a team. We do not have one voice. We had a mission once, 
but I'm not sure what the new one is supposed to be. 
• General Organizational Climate 
When you have only one voice then all the little voices get muddled, then 
no communication is generated. 
• Leadership 
I see your vision as Your Team. Your Voice. Your Mission. 
Someone needs to get down to the lower decks and talk to the working 
people. 
NRSW should communicate and reinforce its goals by personal visits. 
There is considerable opposition to regionalization. NRSW must sell the 
concept. 
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c.        Measuring Infrastructure Cost Savings 
Regional Staff comments: 
This IMAP thing is a charade. IMAP impacts organizational structure, not 
financial method. 
That's the problem; we can't capture specific cost savings right now, 
because the tools weren't in place to do that when the regionalization 
process began. 
It's hard to measure cost savings when your budget keeps getting cut and 
you are constantly in some sort of functionality assessment. 
Several   regional   officials   noted   that,   in  preparing   to   regionalize, 
implementation did not include a process to adequately standardize financial reporting to 
enable regional managers capture, quantify, and document specific program costs or 
savings.    As a result, capturing specific cost savings within programs is extremely 
difficult, or in most cases, impossible [Interviews 8 and 13]. 
While the Installation Management Accounting Project (IMAP) established the 
Installation Core Business Model that became the blueprint for the regional matrix 
structure, it also mandated standardized cost accounting codes across the regions in an 
attempt to accurately capture installation costs. No regional or tenant staff interviewed 
who were involved in financial management used IMAP as a costing tool. 
d. Customer Service 
Regional Staff comments: 
The problem is that the BOS budget cuts are now practically transparent to 
the base COs. All they know is that they aren't getting the money they 
want that they used to have. 
The customer needs to learn to separate shortfalls due to budget cuts from 
regionalization. If they had their BOS back, they still wouldn't have the 
funds they needed, they just can't see that now. They don't see the cuts 
and blame it on regionalization. 
45 
We are $180 million short in critical RPM, BOS is funded at 72 percent, 
which calculates to a 40 percent cut in BOS in the last two years, and 
we've had a 30 percent reduction in personnel. It's hard to maintain 
service levels with cuts like that. 
All regional officials indicated that budgetary shortfalls are impacting 
their customers' perceptions of customer service levels.   There is a perception among 
tenant commands within the Region that regionalization is the cause of their lack of 
funds. Interviews with mid-level regional staff who are also tenant customers confirmed 
those views [Interviews 3 and 6]. 
Budgetary shortfalls have resulted in over $79 million in unfunded 
requirements, including $38.9 million in mission essential requirements, such as civilian 
salaries, which must be funded, or the Region will go into the red and be charged with an 
Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517 violation [CNRSW RM Brief 2001]. One official 
explained that when the Region is focused on trying to stay solvent, customer service 
suffers. The official noted that regional staff must focus their attention on keeping the 
Region out of the red and just do not have the time to reassure customers that they are 
getting all the money the Region can give [Interview 8]. 
e. NAS North Island AIMD Budget Base Transfer 
Regional Staff comments: 
It's a turf war. AIRPAC doesn't share its knowledge and information, like 
SURFPAC does, to allow the Region to support it properly. 
We can't clearly articulate requirements, because we haven't defined the 
boundaries or the mission. At the start of this process we needed to sit 
down and draw the lines of responsibility. 
AIRPAC Staff comments: 
This is an attempt to get discipline back into the system...to have the 
aviation experts making the aviation decisions. 
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It's always a rice bowl issue.. .the decisions were made in vacuums - at all 
levels. 
Who holds the money is pretty transparent at the ground level in AIMD. 
This is really an attempt to align readiness providers with readiness users. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the budget base for the NAS North Island 
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) was transferred to CNRSW for 
distribution, while CNAP maintained Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517 authority for the 
funds.  Interviews with officials on both sides of the transfer have indicated that neither 
side felt the Region should be responsible for AIMD oversight, as the department's 
mission has a direct impact on aviation readiness [Interview 2].   Officials at all levels 
recognized early into the regionalization process the need for CNAP to regain control of 
the AIMD.   As early as June 1999, efforts were begun to transfer all AIMD functions 
back under CNAP control. The following section includes excerpts from a "personal for" 
message sent by CNAP addressing the transfer. 
RMKS/1. COMMODORES, MY STAFF HAS BEEN WORKING 
CLOSELY WITH THE SOUTHWEST REGION, NAS LEMOORE AND 
NAS NORTH ISLAND IN DEVELOPING A PLAN TO TRANSITION 
THE AIMD... OPERATIONS OVER TO TYPE WING CONTROL. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF MOVING...AIMD'S UNDER THE TYPE WING 
COMMANDER WAS BROUGHT FORWARD BY THE SKIPPERS 
FROM NASL (ACOS FOR AIR OPS NRSW) AND NASNI. A 
"CONCEPT OF OPS" BRIEF LAID OUT THE POAM WHICH 
IDENTIFIED DISTINCT ADVANTAGES TO THE ALIGNMENT. 
THESE ADVANTAGES INCLUDED: 
- ALIGNING AVIATION SUPPORT FUNCTIONS WITH THE 
CUSTOMER. 
- PLACING THE AIR TYCOM INTO A CLOSER ROLE OF 
PROVIDING DAY-TO-DAY GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT. 
STANDARDIZING   THE   ORGANIZATION   THROUGHOUT 
PACFLT. 
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TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE ENHANCED "O" AND "I" LEVEL 
INTERFACE UNDER ONE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER. 
3...EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1999,...AIMD OPERATIONS, AT 
THESE TWO ACTIVITIES [NAS LEMOORE AND NAS NORTH 
ISLAND], WILL TRANSITION FROM CNRSW TO CNAP 
(THROUGH THE DESIGNATED WING COMMANDER). DUE TO A 
NUMBER OF REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMMING CHANGES, 
CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE/FINANCIAL TRANSITIONS WILL BE 
POSTPONED UNTIL 01 OCTOBER 2000[CNAP 1999]. 
AIMD and CNAP personnel involved in the transfer reported that it took 
place seamlessly [CNAP 2000].  The only outstanding issue was the financial transition 
that had been postponed until 1 October 2000.   Resource Managers at CNAP were 
expecting a budget-base transfer from the Region of all AOM and AIMD (1A/3A) funds 
that had previously been managed by regional resource managers [Interview 5].   The 
transfer did not occur as scheduled on 1 October 2000, but instead was postponed until 
repeatedly until March 2001 due to conflicts over accountability for a $2 million funding 
shortfall. That issue was addressed, the budget-base transfer is now complete, and CNAP 
no longer routes any funds through the Region, but CNRSW continues to control BOS 
for the air stations. [Interview 15]. Figure 4.4 depicts the new flow. 
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Figure 4.4.      Amended AIMD Funding and Reporting [From Interview 15]. 
When asked about the difficulties encountered with the budget-base 
transfer, both CNRSW and CNAP staff indicated that the initial transfer of the AIMD 
should not have happened [Interviews 5 and 13]. At the beginning of the regionalization 
process, most commands considered to be infrastructure support services were swept up 
into the Region. The weakness in the process, explained one official, was that nobody sat 
down at the beginning with the stakeholders and defined the mission requirements and 
boundaries of infrastructure support. In this case, NASNI AIMD is primarily an 
operational support provider, although it is located on an air station [Interview 13]. 
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E.        SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Navy 
Region Southwest, determined through document reviews and interviews with key 
officials, in order to assess the outcomes of the regionalization process mandated by the 
Chief of Naval Operations in NAVOP 004/97. By highlighting regional issues and 
successes, the analysis provides the insight into the regionalization process in NRSW that 
enables the conclusions drawn in the following chapter. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to assess the outcomes of regionalization in the 
Navy Region Southwest (NRSW). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) mandated 
regionalization of shore installations as a means to streamline shore installation business 
practices and reduce infrastructure costs. Having identified an annual budgetary shortfall 
of $3 to 5 billion to fund force recapitalization and modernization, Navy leadership 
determined significant savings could be realized through reorganization and restructuring 
of shore installation core business functions. "Pressures to [regionalize] come from 
competition between the need to maintain force readiness for the present and the need to 
modernize systems and technology for the fleet of tomorrow [NSB 1999]." 
Responding to the CNO's mandate to regionalize, Commander, Navy Region 
Southwest (CNRSW) established the primary regional goal: achieve a ME20 - Most 
Efficient & Effective Organization - in order to accomplish the CNO's strategic goals for 
regionalization [Appendix A]: 
• Apply state-of-the-market business practices to create an organizational 
structure and process to accelerate positive changes and to manage 
installations with the business perspectives of efficiency, competition, and 
customer satisfaction 
• Reduce infrastructure cost by reducing workforce costs, workforce-related 
expenses, including costs of goods and services, and reducing physical plant 
costs 
This study examines the regionalization process in the Navy Region Southwest 
over the last two years in order to determine if the Region, in seeking to establish a 
ME20, has achieved the objectives of regionalization set forth by the CNO in his 
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Strategie plan.    The following conclusions are based on the results of the analysis 
performed in Chapter IV. 
B.        CONCLUSIONS 
Upon examination of the Region's strengths and weaknesses, the data support the 
assertion that the regionalization process in Naval Region Southwest is meeting the 
objectives for regionalization established by the CNO. It is unreasonable to expect 
regionalization alone to provide the cost savings necessary to fund force modernization, 
however, reductions in infrastructure costs have been achieved and business processes 
have been streamlined through application of state-of-the-market business practices. 
1. Strengths 
Through the data analysis, it became apparent that the Region's two main 
strengths are leadership and the matrix structure.   Senior leadership exhibits high levels 
of commitment and expertise and the matrix organization structure fosters strong 
communication across programs at the senior level. In recognition of superior leadership 
ability, CNRSW has received the annual CNO Installation Excellence Award for two 
consecutive years.   Throughout the interview process it was apparent that the regional 
leaders were proactive, involved, and committed to continual improvement of the Shore 
Installation Management (SIM) process.   One official explained that the regionalization 
process is complete, having met its objectives.   They were now moving on SIM issues 
and focusing on streamlining business processes. Still another declared, "Regionalization 
has demanded cooperation, coordination, and consensus building.  We must manage by 
example and not by edicts" [Interview 9]. 
Regional leaders have demonstrated keen insight in eliminating conflicts before 
they can develop into major barriers to achieving regional goals.  They have recognized 
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that an organization's greatest strength can also be its greatest weakness.    A good 
illustration is the Galactic Radiator organizational matrix discussed in Chapter III (Figure 
3.3).   This structure, which has been lauded as the organizational model for all Navy 
regions, is also perceived as a significant organizational weakness.    While regional 
personnel find the structure effective in maintaining communication across programs, 
previous studies indicate that base COs feel the structure degrades their authority [Illar 
1999].   Identifying this conflict, CNRSW, made adjustments to the Galactic Radiator 
matrix by placing all base CO's on top of the organization chart vice on the side.  This 
simple  change restored power to the  COs  by  integrating  all  of them  into the 
organizational structure, not just those assigned ACOS duties, thus eliminating a potential 
weakness in the structure. 
The matrix structure provides regional program oversight, enabling program 
managers to prioritize distribution of funds as necessary to better serve all customers 
throughout the Region.   This redistribution of wealth prevents the over-development of 
large commands at the expense of the smaller, less visible commands.   Such a process 
can only increase the level of service the Region provides to the fleet, as all commands 
are brought up to a baseline material readiness standard. However, as stated previously, 
even obvious strengths harbor potential weaknesses.   The redistribution of MWR funds 
from San Diego to Lemoore for a new youth center discussed in the previous chapter is a 
vivid illustration of this contradiction.   Taking funds from the highest grossing Naval 
Station Golf Course in the Navy to move children from overflow tents to a new Youth 
Center is a definite strength of regionalization. However, one may note that redirecting 
profits from the organization that generated them could remove the incentive to improve 
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business practices to further increase profits. Regional leadership again identified this 
potential weakness. In an unprecedented move, CNRSW entered into a profit-sharing 
concept with COMNAVBASE San Diego. The MWR Program Manager agreed to allow 
NAVBASE San Diego to retain twenty-five percent of all MWR profits earned for its 
own projects, to stimulate the incentive for further business process improvements. 
The realignment of like-functions under one program manager has also provided 
the flexibility to regionally prioritize program needs, as well as prioritize needs across 
programs through the use of Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). Traditionally, the large bases 
that had the ability to lobby for large budgets received the lion's share of funding for base 
improvements, while the smaller, low-visibility bases struggled with limited funding. 
Regional prioritization of need has provided smaller bases the funding to 
complete needed projects, but has also reaped benefits on a larger scale. The use of the 
prioritized IPL has improved the budget formulation process because in the development 
of the IPL, installation Commanding Officers and Program Managers (PM) are required 
to provide data to justify their funding requirements over others that may appear more 
critical. Therefore, during the budget formulation process, regional leaders are confident 
that only mutually agreed upon and relevant projects are submitted into the next year's 
budget. As a result, the IPL process has improved installation managers' budget planning 
skills. These skills are crucial in the extremely competitive federal budgeting arena. 
The success of the IPL process in NRSW is demonstrated in the CNO's 2003 
prioritized military construction projects listing. Three CNRSW installation projects are 
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listed in the top 10 priorities, totaling $58.7 million, including the number one priority.5 
This collaboration between the leaders, who historically have competed for limited funds, 
to achieve regional objectives did not exist prior to regionalization because each 
command was focused on its own objectives. 
There are numerous examples of the PMs balancing out the level of services to all 
the bases within the Region. In the aggregate, there has been overall improvement in the 
program standards, policy, and customer service. 
2.        Weaknesses 
In analyzing the Region's weaknesses, the two main weaknesses are the lack of 
communication between senior leadership and regional employees and the Region's 
inability to capture specific cost savings. Another issue was addressed as a weakness, 
namely the factors surrounding the AIMD budget-base transfer of AOM and 1A/3A 
funding. However, a weakness that underlies the entire analysis and impacts all areas is 
the Region's inability to prevent continuing budget cuts past the fiscal requirements 
identified to achieve and sustain the ME20. 
The data presented in the preceding chapter suggest that lower level regional 
employees, as well as mid-level managers are not as committed to the regionalization 
concept as is the senior leadership. The problem is common in organizations in 
transition, particularly in organizations whose personnel are disbursed over a large 
geographic area. The phenomena is best described by Henry Mintzberg's Theory of 
Detachment: 
5
 NAF El Centro project was first priority, NF San Clemente Island was fifth priority, and NAS Lemoore was 
tenth priority. 
55 
If the system does the thinking, to produce the strategies to be 
implemented, then...strategies [must be detached] from operations. In 
other words, managers are to manage by remote control, using processes 
that are essentially cerebral...senior managers [are positioned] together 
with planners on a hierarchical pedestal, sufficiently removed from the 
daily pressures of running the business...while everyone down below 
scurries around handling implementation details [Mintzberg 1994]. 
The predominant complaint among the lower level staff was lack of identification 
with the Region due to lack of communication from the top. However, even in this 
weakness, regional leadership has demonstrated a proactive stance through the use of the 
employee satisfaction survey. 
The inability to identify or capture specific cost savings was due primarily to the 
lack   of consistent   standards   that  existed   in  base   accounting   methods  prior  to 
regionalization.   Every Comptroller Office had developed its own accounting system, 
with independent databases, filing systems, and accounting code tracking systems.  The 
lack of interoperability and accounting standards between bases initially created a 
nightmare when the bases were tasked to provide data calls to the Region.   Again, 
however, regional leaders responded to the problem and have established the business 
application platform TREX: Total Regional Execution System that combines accounting 
software, data collection procedures, and budgeting tools into one system, in an attempt 
to  consolidate regional  resource management.     The  TREX platform  was  in the 
implementation stages during research, but has since been adopted by OPNAV N46 for 
application Navy-wide. 
When addressing the NAS North Island AIMD budget-base transfer, Bryson's 
discussion of external stakeholders and performance perception succinctly explains the 
issue: 
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Stakeholders will judge the worth of the organization by how well it meets 
the criteria for success the stakeholders have chosen. For external 
stakeholders in particular [such as CNAP], these criteria typically relate to 
performance. If the organization cannot demonstrate its effectiveness, 
then stakeholders are likely to withdraw their support [Bryson 1995]. 
This was exactly the case with CNAP and the AIMD budget-base transfer. 
Perceiving degradation in mission readiness (lack of performance) as a result of regional 
control of AOM and 1A/3A funds for NAS North Island AIMD, CNAP petitioned 
CINCPACFLT for, and received control of those funds back from the Region. 
The underlying weakness of regionalization, which presents its greatest threat, is 
the inability of regional leadership to convince Navy policymakers that budget 
submissions are accurate assessments of need. The ME20 concept, as designed and 
implemented by regional leadership, allows for minimal slack in the organization. Since 
efficiency is dependent on "focus, precision, analysis, repetition, sanity, discipline, and 
control" [Roberts 2000], this slack is primarily the assurance of funding for additional 
personnel needed during times of surge, heavy leave periods, or changes in mission when 
the personnel system cannot respond quickly enough to changing mission requirements. 
If additional cuts continue at their current rate, the Region will be forced to decide 
between "most efficient" or "most effective." Regional officials argue that both are vital 
to mission success. If funding levels continue to be cut beyond the level needed to 
sustain ME O, the mission of the organization will be significantly degraded for both 
shore and fleet readiness - effectiveness will suffer. One regional official likened the 
delicate process of achieving ME20 to the human body: 
The human body is most effective and performs most efficiently with 
strong bones and muscles, but also requires a small amount of fat for harsh 
winters, or lean months.    Regions are like that.    To be effective and 
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efficient in meeting mission requirements, we must, above all else, protect 
the bone and preserve the muscle, because without them we cannot 
function. However, we also need a small amount of fat, to protect us 
when the lean times come [Interview 9]. 
NRSW has embraced the CNO mandate to streamline business practices and 
reduce costs to the lowest possible level and still maintain mission readiness. If, as 
NRSW approaches ME20, the mentality persists among senior Navy leaders that further 
cuts are always possible the Region will no longer be able to meet mission requirements. 
C.       ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Has regionalization in the Navy Region Southwest achieved the goals 
set forth in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Plan when 
restructuring began, namely apply state-of-the-market business 
practices and reduce infrastructure costs to improve efficiency and 
increase customer service? 
The CNO's goals are being achieved in the Navy Region Southwest. Regional 
leadership is continually identifying and adopting appropriate business practices that they 
determine will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Region through reduced 
costs and increased customer service. Chapter IV contains a detailed analysis of this 
topic. 
• Have significant cost savings been achieved through regionalization? 
Are these cost savings measurable and have they been measured? 
Cost savings have been achieved through regionalization, although not to the 
extent envisioned when the process was initiated. Specific cost savings have proven 
difficult to measure due to lack of standardized accounting and reporting software and 
methods. However, personnel costs savings are readily measured using Full Time 
Equivalents and have been consistently measured, as have economies of scale cost 
savings through contract consolidation. See Chapter IV, sections D.2.C and D.3.C for 
further information. 
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• Have the level, quantity, and quality of service to regional commands 
improved as a result of regionalization? Are there measurable 
indicators for these variables? 
The data analysis presented in Chapter IV indicates that regionalization, in the 
aggregate, has improved the level, quantity, and quality of service provided to commands 
throughout the Region. Customer satisfaction surveys provide measurable indicators of 
these variables throughout the Region's programs. See Chapter IV, section D.2.d for a 
detailed explanation. 
• Are there commonalities across programs in cost savings and/or 
quality of service? If so, what are the commonalities and have they 
been exploited for cost reduction and improved service provision? 
Commonalities were observed across programs. Measurable cost savings were 
achieved through economies of scale and personnel reductions in most programs and are 
being exploited for increased cost reductions. A common problem across all programs 
was the inability to capture specific cost savings other that personnel reduction and 
contract consolidations. Regional leadership has developed the Total Regional Execution 
System to address that issue. Commonalities in quality of service include the 
establishment of baseline levels of service in each program for all commands throughout 
the Region, regardless of geographic location, to ensure continued improvement of 
service provision. See Chapter IV section D for further information. 
• What were the factors involved in the assignment and reassignment of 
AIMD    resource   management   authority   and    responsibility   in 
implementation of regionalization? 
The factors surrounding the AIMD resource management authority are explained 
in detail in Chapter III, section D.2, and Chapter IV, section D.3.e. The primary factor 
was determined to be the failure of leadership on both sides to clearly define the 
boundaries between operational and infrastructure support when regionalization began. 
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AIMD was viewed as infrastructure support; therefore resource management of AOM 
and AIMD BOS (1A/3A) funds was transferred to the Region from CNAP. 
Reassignment back to CNAP resource managers occurred when AIMD was redesignated 
an operational support facility. 
D.   SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
This study has examined the outcomes of regionalization in the Navy Region 
Southwest.   There are several areas that would provide an opportunity for research. 
Some of those areas include: 
• A detailed analysis of the outcomes of regionalization in other regions 
• A detailed comparison of successful cost saving or customer service 
initiatives across regions 
• An examination of the impact of regionalization on operational command 
readiness 
• An analysis of the effect of the Total Regional Execution System (TREX) 
on regional resource management 
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APPENDIX A. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS' 21ST CENTURY 
SHORE SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE VISION AND STRATEGIC 
PLAN 
Appendix A provides pertinent excerpts from the Chief of Naval Operations' 21st 
Century Shore Support Infrastructure Vision and Strategic Plan, including the purpose, 
vision, core values and strategic plan. 
A. PURPOSE 
The 21st Century Shore Support Infrastructure Vision and Strategic Plan portrays 
the strategic direction for the shore support infrastructure. This strategy has been defined 
to enable the shore infrastructure to meet the evolving needs of the naval forces of the 
21st century. This strategic plan is required to reduce total Navy infrastructure costs in 
order to free resources for readiness and recapitalization. 
B. VISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
The Navy is engaged in a comprehensive assessment of our operating forces, 
policies, and support structures to determine our capacity to meet our national 
obligations. Budget realities compel us to embrace real change and drastically reduce 
infrastructure costs in order to sustain quality battle forces for the future. 
To reach this end, this is our vision for an optimal 21st century Navy 
infrastructure: We are focused on supporting fleet readiness. We operate in an 
environment that optimizes the mix of services that Government, industry, and the 
community provide. We provide the majority of shore support from regional complexes 
and other required supporting sites. Installations continue to provide inherently 
Governmental and other statutory requirements. They ensure access to services such as 
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recreational facilities, food, housing, clergy, child care, education, retail, and health care 
that are readily available within the surrounding community. Common services are 
executed by competing providers: the fleet concentration host, regional contractors, and 
the local community. Competition drives cost down and quality up. Installations are 
overseen by military and civilians specifically trained for regional city management; their 
focus is on long-range planning and development to meet emergent mission and budget 
requirements. The old culture of risk avoidance has been replaced with a policy of 
proactive risk management. 
The 21st century Navy infrastructure is lean, focused, and supports the fleet 
effectively. It supports readiness with efficient waste-free application of resources. The 
efficiency of the infrastructure frees money for investment in force structure, a quality 
force, and enhancement of fleet readiness. 
"Forward.. .from the Sea" is ".. .Born Ashore. 
C.        CORE VALUES 
Our vision for the 21st century naval infrastructure and our core values go hand- 
in-hand. They are both focused on reducing costs through a leaner, more effective and 
efficient organization that does not duplicate services and does not sacrifice quality or 
availability. By streamlining our current mode of operations, we will be able to support 
our forces quickly, economically, and conveniently. This will free funds that we can 
invest in our forces and the services that support their families. 
If an employee—military or civilian—must worry about the availability of 
services that we all take for granted, or how long it will take to get them, or how they will 
be paid for, that employee will not be as effective on the job. This lack of effectiveness 
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and concentration can have the same ripple effect as a pebble dropped in a pond: its 
impact keeps spreading until it noticeably affects the other areas and personnel. 
Therefore, we have established the following as our core values for implementation of 
this vision. We will not deviate from them. Without them, our vision has no merit. 
• We will care for our military and civilian personnel and their families by 
providing an acceptable, affordable quality of life 
• We will support the fleet effectively under all conditions at the lowest 
possible cost 
• We will use resources efficiently 
D.       THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
Strategic Issue 1:      Apply state-of-the-market business practices 
Key Accomplishment 1: Create an organizational structure and process to 
accelerate positive changes. 
GOAL 1:        OPTIMIZE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE TO ENABLE 
EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. 
Objective 1: Reduce the number of claimants who provide installation 
management policy and funding to an optimal number by 
eliminating management layers between claimants and installation 
managers, identifying opportunities for realignment in 
"stovepiped" organizations, and regionalizing base support 
functions. 
Objective 2: Eliminate unnecessary inspections, reports, and other forms of 
oversight. 
Objective 3: Determine and implement the most efficient organization based on 
a regional installation management concept. 
Objective 4: Establish installation management career progression with 
associated multiyear curricula for professional development of 
military and civilian personnel. This curricula should include an 
internship with select city management. 
Objective 5: Identify organization functions and training opportunities that the 
Reserve component can accomplish through peacetime 
contributory support. 
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GOAL 2:        DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A PROCESS THAT MOTIVATES 
AND ACCELERATES POSITIVE CHANGE. 
Objective 1: Eliminate policies, laws, and regulations that inhibit or restrict 
change and inflate costs. Take advantage of defense performance 
review concepts. 
Objective 2: Designate regional commanders as reinvention labs to encourage 
the rapid generation of innovative ideas and 
approaches. 
Objective 3: Promote the use of existing waiver programs to minimize 
overlapping policies and regulations and to eliminate outdated 
policies and regulations. 
Objective 4: Provide incentives to Commanders by rewarding efficiencies; 
consider options such as a 25% return on savings generated. 
Objective 5: Drive decisions to the lowest level by motivating and enabling 
commanders to make more of the decisions affecting their regional 
complexes and installations with a vision towards long-range goals 
as opposed to short-term objectives. 
Objective 6: Provide incentives to tenants to streamline processes and operate in 
a cost-effective manner. 
Objective 7:    Review inter/intra-service support agreements (ISSAs) to ensure 
adequate cost visibility and accountability. 
Key Accomplishment 2: Manage installations with the business perspectives 
of efficiency, competition, and customer satisfaction. 
GOAL 1:        IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF BUSINESS DECISIONS. 
Objective 1: Develop a base accounting system in order to understand the real 
costs of doing business at the appropriate levels. 
Objective 2:    Restrict oversight and centralized control to regional managers. 
Objective 3: Provide common function management tools that promote near- 
and long-term plans to assess the contribution of services to 
mission effectiveness. 
Objective 4: Develop performance-based ISSAs that have adequate feedback 
mechanisms. 
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Objective 5: At the broadest level possible, obtain services from the most cost- 
effective sources and execute services in the most cost-effective 
manner to sustain readiness. 
GOAL 2: DEVELOP AND USE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) 
AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (MOPS) FOCUSED ON 
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS, NOT INPUTS. 
Objective 1: Develop benchmarks of world-class MOE tools, other metrics, and 
required operational capabilities and capacities (ROCCs). 
Objective 2:    Adopt state-of-the-market standards for commercially available 
services. 
Objective 3:    Obtain a cost accounting system that identifies the full cost of 
providing each service, utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
software that is designed to aid the management process and 
encourage fiduciary responsibility. 
GOAL 3:       APPLY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY TO 
REDUCE OTHER OVERHEAD AND FIXED COSTS. 
Objective 1: Apply approved practices from the Navy Smart Base initiative, the 
shore installation equivalent of Smart Ship, to improve shore 
installation management and reduce overhead. 
Objective 2: Exploit the use of COTS/GOTS technologies in order to improve 
the affordability of operations. 
Objective 3: Evaluate and implement information management systems for 
reporting and tracking metrics for all levels. 
Strategic Issue #2: Reduce infrastructure cost 
Key Accomplishment 1: Reduce workforce cost 
GOAL 1:       REGIONALIZE OR CONSOLIDATE BASE OPERATING 
SUPPORT (BOS) FUNCTIONS IN FLEET CONCENTRATION 
AREAS (FCAS) AND STAND-ALONE AND OVERSEAS 
INSTALLATIONS TO ELIMINATE REDUNDANT OR EXCESS 
BILLETS FROM ACTIVITIES THAT PERFORM SIMILAR 
FUNCTIONS. CREATE REGIONAL/LOCAL POOLS FROM 
WHICH TENANT ACTIVITIES CAN OBTAIN COMMON 
SERVICES LESS EXPENSIVELY THAN IF THEY PERFORMED 
THOSE FUNCTIONS IN-HOUSE. 
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Objective 1: Conduct and implement regionalization analyses in FCAs, CONUS 
stand-alone installations, and overseas installations. Include all 
Services in the discussions. Make the analysis increasingly more 
sophisticated and complete. Conduct regional analyses at least 
once every 5 years. 
Objective 2: Identify opportunities to consolidate higher level functions across 
regions using the N4 Optimizing Shore Support Infrastructure 
(OSSI) Model that focuses on cost rather than functions. 
GOAL 2:       IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
REGIONALIZATION/CONSOLIDATION ANALYSES, 
CONTINUE TO REDUCE OPERATING COSTS BY 
STREAMLINING OPERATIONS, DETERMINING THE RIGHT 
SOURCE (INCLUDING GOVERNMENT AND NON- 
GOVERNMENT SOURCES), AND ELIMINATING FUNCTIONS 
NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASK: "WHAT MUST THE 
GOVERNMENT OWN AND WHAT CAN IT RENT TO SUPPLY 
EFFECTIVE SHORE SUPPORT?". CHOOSE AND ACT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
Objective 1: Review installation and tenant functions to identify opportunities 
to consolidate, realign, or eliminate functions available within the 
community or no longer required. 
Objective 2: Perform functional analyses to ascertain which are inherently 
Governmental versus non-Governmental functions, then perform 
"make vs. buy" analyses to choose and buy non-Governmental 
functions from the right source. Use outsourcing, privitization, and 
dual use of facilities. 
Objective 3: Determine the optimal process for executing Governmental 
functions by focusing on readiness and most efficient 
organizations. 
GOAL 3:        REGIONALIZE THE BASE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE BEST 
SERVICE INTEROPERABILITY AT THE LOWEST COST. 
Objective 1: Site weapons systems and specialized or unique support 
infrastructure based on common equipment vice Service 
considerations (for example, Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
(JAST)-based aircraft). Default to a lead Service in the case of a 
Joint weapon system. 
Key Accomplishment 2: Reduce workforce-related expenses, including costs of 
goods and services. 
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GOAL 1:       INVEST IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THAT ENABLES 
THE WORKFORCE TO PERFORM EQUAL OR BETTER 
SERVICE LESS EXPENSIVELY. 
Objective 1:    Establish virtual offices through telecommuting. 
Objective 2:    Develop information management systems for centralized planning 
capabilities. 
Objective 3:    Substitute teleconferencing for travel. 
GOAL 2:      REALIZE SAVINGS FROM WORKFORCE COST REDUCTION 
INITIATIVES. 
Objective 1:    Reduce consumption of materials and utilities. 
Objective 2:    Assess the savings from homebasing. 
Objective 3:    Optimize maintenance required for remaining facilities. 
Objective 4: Outsource or "civilian substitute" heartland, stand-alone 
installations to eliminate the need for QOL support services 
required by military presence (e.g., galleys, housing, MWR). 
GOAL 3:       FIND MORE COST-EFFECTIVE WAYS TO PROVIDE 
PERCEIVED ENTITLEMENTS, BENEFITS, AND OTHER QOL 
SERVICES. 
Objective 1: Partner with neighboring communities to eliminate duplicate 
functions inside the fence line. 
Objective 2:    Privatize, outsource, or civilianize where cost-effective. 
Objective 3: Empower individuals to obtain entitlements, benefits, and other 
QOL expectations on their own. 
Key Accomplishment 3: Reduce physical plant costs. 
GOAL 1:       REDUCE THE PROLIFERATION OF REDUNDANT FACILITIES 
WITHIN FCAS. 
Objective 1:    Consolidate the streamlined workforce into fewer facilities. 
Objective 2: Perform regional planning for multipurpose or multicustomer 
facilities. 
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GOAL 2:        MAINTAIN A MINIMAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOOTPRINT, 
BASED ON THE OUTYEAR PROJECTION OF UTILIZATION 
REQUIREMENTS. 
Objective 1: Demolish unneeded, aging facilities that cannot be cost-effectively 
retrofitted for continued service. 
Objective 2:    Divest the service of excess infrastructure and property. 
Objective 3: Outlease any excess, unused real property that is judged necessary for 
mobilization/surge capacity, both to ensure the property is maintained 
and to generate revenue for the installation. 
GOAL 3:       ESTABLISH LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR BY CAPITALIZING OR FUNDING 
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS THAT ARE INTEGRAL TO THE 
WAY WE OPERATE OUR PHYSICAL PLANTS FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF LONG-TERM PAYBACK. 
Objective 1:    Invest in energy conservation programs. 
Objective 2:    Invest in hazardous materials management programs. 
Objective 3:    Invest in waste management and recycling programs. 
Objective 4:    Invest in technology programs that increase efficiency and reduce 
manning requirements. 
Objective 5:    Invest in environmental restoration and cleanup programs. 
GOAL 4:        INCORPORATE LIFE-CYCLE COST (LCC) ANALYSES FOR 
ALL FUTURE ACQUISITIONS AND FACILITIES. 
Objective 1: Develop a means to accurately predict LCC and projected return 
on investment. 
Objective 2: Incorporate an LCC model into all acquisition/procurement or 
construction plans to ensure adequate design, construction, 
training, operation, maintenance, and final disposition support for 
the design life of the system. 
Objective 3: Develop and implement an optimal maintenance program to enable 
systems, structures, and equipment to reach their design life. 
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Objective 4:    Establish a culture that allows the return of a minimum of 2.5% of 
current plant value for maintenance. 
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APPENDIX B. STREAMLINED BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 













Objective/Scope of Analysis 
Assumptions 
Current Concept of Operations 






9. Analysis Team Members 
10. Review Group Action 
Attachments: 
A. Current Functional Manpower Listing 
B. Current Organization: Base Security 
C. Proposed Concept of Operations: Base Security 
D. Current Proposed End-Strength by Function Matrix 
1. Executive Summary 
l.a Alternatives Explored 
l.a.l. Regionalization of all security and law enforcement programs under regional 
coordinator. 
l.a.2. Regionalization of specific security functions (i.e., MWD, investigations, training, 
dispatch, PASS & ID) and establishment of district patrol/guard detachments under 
the regional coordinator 
l.a.3. Centralize specific security functions under lead activity(s) 
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.Lb Analysis Team Proposed Concept of Operations 
l.b.l. Current Concept of Operations: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT) activities have the largest number of security personnel at four 
major stations, all operating independently. Naval Medical Center (NAVMEDCEN) 
and Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) maintain 
their own security organizations and make up the bulk of remaining manpower 
dedicated to security in the San Diego area. 
l.b.2. Proposed Concept of Operations: Consolidate security operations under 
CINCPACFLT claimancy with the regional coordinator, Commander, Naval Base 
San Diego (COMNAVBASE SD), as the lead agency. Perform common service 
functions (MWD, investigations, PASS & ID, training, dispatching) from a regional 
team at COMNAVBASE SD. Daily security functions/services would be performed 
out of three detachments (North Island, Naval Station (NAVSTA), SUBASE Point 
Loma) whose Officers in Charge (OICs) would report to COMNAVBASE SD, 
ADDU to the installation CO where they are located. 
|                        l.c Anticipated Savings (all figures shown in FY98 $K) 
1      Current State Proposed State (Alt 
1) 
Annual Savings $ Annual Savings % 1 
1           $28,397 $22,528 $5,869 21%              | 
|                                                    l.d Staff Reductions                                                    | 
|      Current State Proposed State 
(Altl) 
# Reduction % Reduction      1 
705 578 127 18%             | 
|                                        l.e Review Group Recommendation                                       | 
1       l.e.l .Implement the alternative. Security OICs would report, however, directly to the 1 
regional commanders and ADDU to COMNAVBASE SD rather than the reverse as 
1       described in the alternative.                                                                                           | 
l.f Review Group Alternative—estimate 
Current State Proposed State Reduction/Savings % 
Reduction/Savings 
Operating Costs 
$28,397 $22,528 $5,869 21% 
Billets 
705 578 127 18% 
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l.g Additional Recommendations (if any) 
• Charter a working group to study the potential reorganization of the PASS & ID 
system. 
• Revalidate  the  security post requirements  at non-CINCPACFLT  activities. 
(CINCPACFLT posts validated Jan/Feb 96) 
l.h Business Case Analysis (BCA) Team Observations/Comments 
• Improvements in communications, connectivity, and computer processing will be 
required to support regionalized dispatch, PASS & ID functions, and reporting 
requirements between site activities and the regional coordinator. 
• Military billets were already reduced in PR-97 (20%). Takes effect in FY97. 
These were not considered in the current state or as potential savings in this analysis. 
• NAVMEDCEN Efficiency Review (ER) Most Efficient Organization (MEO) 
reflects 77 manpower requirements currently proposed for its security department. 
These MEO requirements were used in the analysis as baseline requirements for 
NAVMEDCEN. When NAVMEDCEN security is brought into the San Diego 
regional security concept, an estimated 46 of 77 manpower requirements can be 
saved. 
2. Objective/Scope of Analysis 
The objective is to save money and reduce requirements by restructuring shore 
installation management functions and organizations in San Diego. This analysis focused 
on the potential regionalization of all security functions in San Diego. 
2a. Description/Definition of Functions 
This functional analysis includes those billets associated with dispatch, physical 
security, police functions and guards, training, personnel, payroll, dog handlers, and 
kennels. 
3. Assumptions 
3.a. Standard Streamlined Business Case Analysis (SBCA) Assumptions 
3.a.l. Activity commanders will retain the responsibility and authority for their 
primary mission functions. Activities whose primary mission functions cross 
over into installation management functions are considered in the SBCA. 
3.a.2. Although the following may be constraints or impediments to 
implementing a proposed regional function, and as such need to be identified 
and costed (if possible), they are not considered in the development of the 
regionalized organization: current funding streams, current chain of command 
and claimant alignment, up-front costs, lack of current information network 
exchanges. 
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3.a.3. Workload is assumed to be steady between current and proposed 
organizations unless there is documented evidence to the contrary. 
3.a.4. The SBCA focuses on regionalization. Revised work processes and 
alternate sources for the function were not considered in the analysis unless 
required by the proposed regional organization. However, when identifiable, 
these issues have been included in the narrative portion of the SBCA. 
3.a.5. Non-Navy activities, including the USMC, were generally not included in 
the analysis. 
3.a.6. The SBCA is based primarily on manpower savings obtained by changing 
from current organizational relationships to proposed (regional) organizational 
relationships. The SBCA used only that level of accuracy necessary to 
estimate savings and feasibility of the proposed organization. Billet 
reductions were estimated and FY98 programming composite salary rates 
were used for comparison and estimation purposes; wage and pay grade 
distributions were not identified. 
3.a.7. No target reduction percentages were given. 
3.a.8. Impact on ship-shore rotation, community management, and other 
initiatives (home basing) were not considered in the analysis. 
3.a.9. This analysis assumes that billet reductions can be achieved through 
attrition and no reduction in force (RIF) is necessary. Should a RIF become 
necessary, the appropriate RIF costs should be factored in. 
4. Current Concept of Operations 
4.a. Results of the initial data call indicated that 28 San Diego commands under 
11 claimants performed some security functions. 821 security billets were identified. A 
review of these billets by the BCA team revealed that 243 of those 821 billets should not 
be considered for consolidation/regionalization for one or more of the following reasons: 
• Brig/TPU is a stand-alone evolution. 
• Information security/automated data processing (ADP) security/special 
security should remain at individual commands, due to its unique nature. 
• It was not clear how savings could be obtained through the reduction of 
contracted security services at Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) 
activities. 
• Billets were at afloat/operational/deployable staffs. 
• Single billets dedicated to internal security. 
4.b. Considered in the BCA analysis were 9 physical security/law enforcement 
functions and some 578 billets at 12 commands under 5 claimants. The 127 positions at 
NCCOSC (DBOF) were not considered, but will be addressed separately focusing on 
reimbursable services provided to DBOF activities. 
4.C. See attachments A and B for a current manpower list and organizational 
chart. 
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5. Proposed Concept of Operations 
5.a. The proposed concept of operations for San Diego region security services 
consolidates all security and law enforcement operations (except NCCOSC) into three 
detachments located at Naval Air Station North Island (NAS North Island), Naval Station 
San Diego (NAVSTA SD), and Submarine Base San Diego (SUBASE SD). These 
detachments would be responsible for performing routine/daily law enforcement/security 
functions in designated geographical areas. Also, common services such as dispatching, 
investigations, training, MWD, and PASS & ID would be centralized under the regional 
coordinator. A total of 107 billets (19.7% of current force) would be saved. 
Detachments and command functions would be managed by the regional coordinator; 
however, detachment security officers would report ADDU to the station CO where they 
are located. See attachment C. 
5.b. Timeline for implementation: 
5.b. 1. MWD regionalization could occur in FY97. 
5.b.2. Training and investigations could occur in FY97 if space utilization is 
properly planned. 
5.b.3. Detachments could be stood up in FY97 if computer data links occur. 
5.b.4. Dispatch and PASS & ID requires technology review, funding, purchase, 
and installation of equipment.   Estimate to be implemented during FY98 if 
funding provided. 
5.C. Current initiatives that affect proposal: 
5.C.I. CINCPACFLT funded study in March 1996 for INTEGRAPH Corp. to 
regionalize dispatch centers (security/fire/medical). 
5.C.2. CINCPACFLT currently reviewing MWD program to regionalize greater 
San Diego kennels. 
5.d. Initial savings will be accrued by the reduction of civilian billets. However, 
additional savings may be recognized in the area of equipment (i.e., vehicles, patrol 
equipment, communication base stations, etc.). Also, a consolidated dispatch center 
(security/medical/fire) may save personnel in other emergency services functions. The 
proposed concept of operations to staff dispatch centers with three personnel per shift 
will accommodate dispatching of the three services. See attachment D. 
6. Barriers 
6.a. There are not the compatible communications and intrusion detection 
systems/monitoring equipment necessary to centralize dispatch and security 
communication networks and information systems. Table 7.c, Implementation Costs, 
show an estimate of a one-time cost of $5M and recurring costs of $500K/yr. 
6.b. Lines of authority must be redefined. 
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6.C. Activities must be convinced that an acceptable level of service and response 
will be maintained. 
7. Cost Analysis 











Officer 8 635 7 556 79 
Enlisted 316 10,607 274 9,198 1,409 
Civilian 381 17,155 297 12,775 4,380 
Contractor 
Total 705 28,397 578 22,528 5,869 
7.b Implementation Costs (savings estimates are shown in FY98 $K) 
Description of Implementation Costs One-Time Costs Recurring Costs 
Communications    equipment    and    alarm 
panels for consolidated dispatch center 
Computer hardware and  software to  link 
PASS & ID and other reporting systems 







Total $5,200 $520 
8. Recommendations 
8.a. Regionalize all security functions in the San Diego area. 
8.b. Charter a team to review the PASS & ID organizational requirements. 
8.c.      Conduct   detailed   cost   analysis   on   a   centralized   dispatch   center 
(CINCPACFLT has in progress). 
8.d. Implement MWD regionalization in FY97. 
8.e.  Consolidate all training, including small arms training, to a single regional 
unit. 
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9. Analysis Team Members 
Name 
Charles Faircloth 
LCDR Tim Mueller 









COMNAVBASE San Diego (LEPS) 
CPF Manpower Analysis Team 
COMNAVAIRPAC 
Global Associates, Ltd. 
Prospective COMNAVBASE Sec. Off. 









lO.a. Date Presented to Review Group 
23 May 1996 
lO.b. Review Group Decision 
Adopt the regionalization alternative modified to have the Security OICs report 
direct to the regional commanders and ADDU to COMNAVBASE SD. 
lO.c. Review Group Comments 
• Agreed that day-to-day operations must remain under the control of the regional 
commanders rather than COMNAVBASE SD 
• Expect significant efficiencies to be gained 
• Although the transfer of DBOF billets is more complex, agreed that function must be 
transferred into new regionalized security network. 


















Police/Guard 10/6 33/38 43/81 27/- 31- 8/- -55 10/- 52/- 194/125 319 
Police/Guard 
Sup. 
7/2 3/22 10/21 91- 31- -IS -n -/l 5/1 37/47 85 
PASS & ID 21- 4/6 2/2 1/1 -/4 11- -/ll -12 10/15 25 
Dispatch 61- 2/4 -16 61- 21- 21- -16 61- 24/10 34 
Investigation 
s 
1/- 2/3 1/5 21- -l\ 31- 9/9 17 
Phys 
Security 
-12 -12 21- -l\ -143 -/4 -16 -11 2/16 18 
MWD 21- 4/- 13/2 21- 21/2 23 
Training 21- 2/3 2/4 21- 11- -12 21- 61- Mil 24 
Admin 
Support 
-n 3/9 4/- 1/1 -no 
" 
-n -12 8/25 33 
ATTACHMENT A 
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Current Organization: Base Security 
>Definition: Billets providing security and law enforcement 

































734 total personnel, 7 claimants 
San Diego Regionalization 
ATTACHMENT B 
Proposed Concept of Operations: Base Security 
> Concept: Regionalized security administered by COMNAVBASE SD. 
NCCOSC would continue to provide its own security functions. 














598 total personnel, 2 claimants 
San Diego Regionalization 
ATTACHMENT C 
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Police/Guard 194/125 319 304 
Police/Guard 
Supervisor 37/48 85 56 
PASS & I.D. 10/15 25 18 
Dispatching 24/10 34 18 
Investigations 9/ 9 18 10 
Physical Security 
(Info/Pers, AIS...) 2/16 18 10 
Military Working Dog 21/ 2 23 15 
Training 17/ 7 24 10 
Admin. Support 8/24 32 30 
Comparison Totals: 578 471 
ATTACHMENT D 
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